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PRESUMPTIONS
ALF UE L. GAusEvrrz*
I
Rule 13. Definition. A presumption is an assumption of fact
resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action.
The definitional problems of presumptions have been whether
the word "presumption" includes an "inference," a "conclusive presumption," and a "permissive presumption." As defined by Rule 13,
the term includes a "conclusive presumption" but the word "requires" in the definition excludes the other two.
The inclusion of conclusive presumptions in the definition is
both expedient and harmless notwithstanding the truth of the
words of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Ryan v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co.:
"We have just used the phrase 'non-conclusive presumptions.'
The implication is that there are also conclusive presumptions.
Not so if we are to think with desirable precision. Whqat we term
a conclusive presumption is really a rule of law."'1
It is expedient because the use of the term, at least in statutes,
will probably persist in some states if not in Minnesota and this is
intended to be a uniform law. It is harmless because the inclusion
in the definition does not purport to give the term any special effect.
Analytically and functionally it remains whatever it was. The Rule
would not change the Minnesota law. It may add to confusion to
continue using the term, as, for example, when a court says "a contributing violation made out a conclusive case against the violator,"without specifying that it means conclusive only in the absence of
opposing evidence. But this would be a trivial addition, if any, to
the confusion which seems bound to attend the presumption problem. There would continue to be "conclusive presumptions" even if
use of the term could be and were forbidden, and whatever problems they create wouldl also continue.
As to the "inference" problem, if there still be one, the Comment
to the Rulk points out that "The rule limits presumptions to situations where the assumption must be made, at least initially, from
established basic facts which give it birth. Thus we are not dealing
generally with the mental process of drawing inferences from evidence but are dealing with the process of presuming facts from other
*Dean, College of Law, University of New Mexico.
1. 206 Minn.562, 567, 289 N. W 557, 559 (1939).
2. Olson v. Duluth, M. & I. Ry., 213 Minn. 106, 113, 5 N. NV. 2d 49,
496 (1942).
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facts." The distinction is between a matter of logic and experience
and a rule of law The Minnesota court in the Ryan case recognized
that, strictly
this, saying "We agree with Dean Wigmore
speaking, all presumptions are those of law, and that there are, in
the proper sense, none of fact. When we leave law for fact, it is
better to speak of inference, or deduction, or mere argument, rather
than presumption." This was recognized and the old "presumption
of fact" was discarded long before Wigmore. But we shall ptobably
continue carelessly to say "presume" when we mean "infer" and to
add to the presumption confusion by not making clear whether we
are relying upon the inference inherent in the basic facts of a presumption as an inference or as a presumption. While Rule 13 will
not change Minnesota law it may help some to reduce this obstinate
and pernicious practice.
As to "permissible presumptions," there are rules of law that
permit, but do not require, a fact to be found from another fact
or group of facts that might not justify the finding as a matter of
logic. Such a rule of law gives an artificial effect to evidence and
might legitimately be kept within or added to the family of presumptions. One leading scholar has consistently urged that this be
done. 3 On the other hand, it has been said that, "The only difficulty with this suggestion is that there is danger that it will simply
add one more term of dubious and confusing connotation to consuffering from the
tribute to the uncertainties of a subject already
4
practice."
same
the
of
much
too
of
results
McCormick says, "Probably the best practical treatment of the
problem of nonmenclature is to recoguize the word 'presumption'
as a collective term embracing both varieties of procedural rules,
but to distinguish the two as permissive presumptions, and mandatory presumptions."' But in the drafting of rules that are to state
the effects of presumptions, the inclusion of permissive presumptions
in the definition is not a mere matter of nomenclature. Subsequent
rules would have to state the effect of permissive presumptions.
As I understand it, permissive presumptions persist even though
there be opposing evidence sufficient to take the case to the jury
but short of that which would require a directed verdict. That effect
might not be difficult to describe, but it would be complicated. The
Rules follow standard usage in this and would not change the
Minnesota law even though Minnesota now has what are, in effect,
3. McCormick, Evidence 629 (1954) (hereinafter cited as McCormick).

4. Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tul. L. Rev. 17, 178, 193
n. 176 (1930).
5. McCormick 640.
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permissive presumptions. Like conclusive presumptions, to exclude
them from the definitions of presumption will not abolish or change
them. Thus the-res zpsa loquitur will continue.
In a criminal case a presumption against the accused cannot
be mandatory because the judge may not direct a verdict of guilty.0
The Rules do not differentiate between civil and criminal cases.
A presumption against the accused would have to be treated to
some extent as permissive to avoid the constitutionality question. In
the Prefatory Note to the Uniform Rules it is said:
"It should be noted that no special effort-has been made to
relate the rules of admissibility to all possible limitations arising
out of constitutional requirements of due process, personal
security and the like: Of course a given rule would be inoperative in a given situation where there would occur from its
application an invasion of constitutional rights. That goes
without saying."
Perhaps a rule of mandatory presumption would not have to be
held Wholly inoperative against an accused. In view of the constitutional limitation an argument could be made that in a criminal
case a presumption is not one that "requires" the assumption of fact
within the meaning of that word in Rule 13.
Although Rule 13 defines a presumption, it does not require or
specify the full effect of that word as it is used in statutes. Any rule
of law that requires the assumption of one fact from the establishment of another is a presumption, regardless of the language used.
Nothing else is. A rule of law that creates a presumption should
specify the basic fact or facts, the presumed fact or facts, and, if it is
not a conclusive presumption, the conditions upon which the presumption loses its force; similarly so if the rule creates a permissive
or some other variety of "presumption." But the legislature will not
always spell it out. The courts will have to construe the statutes
and the Rules will be of little help. The language is likely to be
"shall be prima facie evidence" or "shall be presumptive evidence,"
rather than "there shall be a presumption that." Such words will
usually be held to create a mandatory presumption.
"In spite of Professor Wigiore's criticism .. of the use of
'prima facie evidence' as equivalent to the notion of presumption,
a general survey of the cases involving statutory presumptions
does not seem to .justify one in seeking to distinguish between
the legal consequences following the use of either term in the
statute. A few cases, however, have drawn such a distinction....

Even in those criminal cases involving statutory prima facie
presumptions, th6 merely 'permissive' effect given the presump6. State v. Corey, 182 Minm.48, 233 N. W 590 (1930).
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tion by a majority of the cases is generally attributed to the
presence of constitutional safeguards
rather than to the
legislature's choice of language..
"7
The Minnesota statutes abound with references to presumptions.
Each would have to be scrutinized in order to predict what the effect
8
will be. The problem can be troublesome.
Adoption of Rule 13 would not transform any statutory or
judicially created presumption from mandatory to permissive, or
the converse, but it would alter the effect of any prior mandatory
presumption to give it the effects stated in Rules 14, 15, and 16, if
the rule of law creating the presumption had prescribed an effect
different from those Rules. Further, it would prevent the judiciary,
but not the legislature, from prescribing a different effect from mandatory presumptions which the courts may create in the future.
Rule 14. Effect of Presumptions. Subject to Rule 16, and
except for presumptions which are conclusive or irrefutable
under the rules of law from which they arise, (a) if the facts
from which the presumption is derived have any probative
value as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, the presumption continues to exist and the burden of establishing the
non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against
whom the presumption operates, (b) if the facts from which
the presumption arises have no probative value as evidence of
the presumed fact, the presumption does not exist when evidence
is introduced which would support a finding of the non-existence
of the presumed fact, and the fact which would otherwise be
presumed shall be determined from the evidence exactly as if
no presumption was or had ever been involved.
Rule 16, which is excepted from the operation of Rule 14, provides for those special presumptions "which by a rule of law may
be overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or by clear
and convincing evidence." Under Clause (a) of Rule 14 all other
presumptions based on facts which would serve as circumstantial
evidence would shift the burden of persuasion as well as the burden
of producing evidence. As stated in the comment, "Nearly all
presumptions are of this sort." This would reverse for all such
presumptions what the court held in the Ryan case" and reaffirmed
7 Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tul. L. Rev. 17, 43 n. 68
(1930). See also 18 Minn. L. Rev. 806 (1934).
8. See Olson v. Duluth, M. & I. Ry., 213 Minn. 106, 5 N. W 2d 492
(1942). Peterson, J., in dissenting, seemed to argue that section 169.96 of the
Highway Traffic Regulation Act which provides. "In all civil actions, a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, by either or any of the parties to
such action or actions shall not be negligence per se but shall be prima facie
evidence of negligence only," was not only merely permissive but also made
the question of negligence one of fact for the jury even though the evidence
was such that a court would have directed a verdict of negligence absent the
statute.
9. 206 Minn. 562, 289 N. W 557 (1939).
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1t
in TePoel v. Larson
and in subsequent cases." The rule adopted
by the cases cited is commonly referred to as the Thayer doctrine,
or the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine. In the Ryan case the court said:
"The function of a presumption, as shown first by Thayer
and then by Wigmore . . . is solely to control decisions on a
group of unopposed facts.... In such cases there is nothing for
the jury. Decision is controlled by a rule of law .... With us a
presumption does not shift the burden of proof [persuasion]....
This seems to be the point at which Mr. Morgan disagrees with
the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine. His conclusion is that there
should be a general rule, by 'uniform statute' if need be, 'that the
sole effect of every presumption shall be to place upon the
opponent the burden of persuading the trier of fact of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.' "12
Mr. Morgan later proposed that the burden of persuasion be
shifted only in cases of presumptions based on facts which would
support an inference. The American Law Institute for its Model
Code of Evidence, of which he was reporter and draftsman, rejected this proposal and adopted the Thayer doctrine for all presumptions.' 3 Morgan's proposal was, however, substantially adopted
by Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules.
Under the Thayer doctrine adopted in Minnesota the presumption merely shifts the burden of producing evidence. Once the
evidence opposing the presumption is sufficient to justify a finding
or verdict, the presumption, having fully performed its function, disappears, and there is no need for further mention of it. If such opposing evidence is not produced, the judge will order a dismissal,
direct a verdict, or take whatever other action is required to give
effect to the assumption required by the presumption and need not
say that this is done because of the presumption. Under the Thayer
doctrine the presumption either will be or will not be rebutted. In
neither case is there necessity or justification for mentioning the
presumption to the jury. Therefore the cases usually involve the
question whether it was error to give or refuse to give an instruction
on the presumption involved in the case. In the Ryan case the court
admitted that prior decisions had not consistently applied the
doctrine:
"The theory of presumptions and their function, as here
considered and adopted, runs counter to much that has been said
10. 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W. 2d 468 (1952).
11. Kath v. Kath, 238 Minn. 120, 55 N. W. 2d 691 (1952); Knuth v.
Mlurphy, 237 Minn. 225, 54 N. W. 2d 771 (1952).
12. 206 Minn. at 267, 289 N. W. at 560.
13. 18 ALI Proceedings 226 (1941), quoted in Falknor, Evidence, 29
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 953, 987 n. 145 (1954) ; Model Code of Evidence, Rules 701704 (1942).
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in earlier decisions. We attempt no explicit expurgation.
To
the extent that their implications are opposed1 4 to what is here
declared, such decisions

should be ignored.1

Notwithstanding this clear-cut opinion, the trial courts continued to
make departures from the Thayer doctrine. They were sternly corrected by the TePoel case
"The rule we adopted in the Ryan case does not permit the
trial court to determine whether the presumption should or
should not be given [mentioned to the jury] Statements to the
contrary in our opinions subsequent to the Ryan case are expressly overruled. The presumption, being a rule of law, under
the view we have accepted, should be applied uniformly in all
cases where it may be invoked at all."' 15
The mention of the presumption was held to be reversible error.
Two other points in these two cases are significant. In the Ryan
case the court had said
"We are also within the restricted area of the presumption
against suicide. So our decision concerns no other, althouh
of necessity discussion and implication cannot be so limited.' 10
This is a recognition that the reasons back of different presumptions
may require different rules. The opinion in the TePoel case seems
to be laying down a rule for all presumptions or at least all save
very special presumptions. The other point is that in the Ryan case
the court said
"
the evidence of suicide may consist wholly of testimony
which the jury may discredit. In such a case it would be proper
to charge them that, if they did reject all such evidence as incredible, it would be their duty to find the death accidental. That
would be by reason of the17presumption, as a rule of law, operating on unopposed facts."'
This was heresy under the Thayer doctrine, however sensible it
may be to recognize that a presumption which the law has found
of sufficient importance to create should not be dissipated by a mere
mouthing of words which no one believes, as Morgan early pointed
out. The court in the TePoel case did not expressly repudiate the
last quoted language of the Ryan case, but it certainly recognized
no exception to the rule that a presumption must not be mentioned
to the jury and apparently disapproved the Ryan dictum.
Clause (b) of Rule 14 adopts the Thayer doctrine in its pure
form as to presumptions based on facts which would not support
an inference of the presumed fact. As to those presumptions, therefore, the Minnesota law would not be changed by the adoption of the
14. 206 Minn. at 571, 289 N. W at 561.
15. 236 Minn. at 493, 55 N. W 2d at 474.
16. 206 Minn.at 567, 289 N. W at 560.
17 Id. at 570, 289 N. W at 561.
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Rule. But Rule 14 would radically change the Minnesota law as to
the majority of presumptions-those based on facts which would
support an 'inference of the presumed fact. 18 This is the important
point.
Would the adoption of Rule 14 effect any subsidiary or incidental changes m Minnesota law? In the TePoel case the presumption- operated against the party who already had the burden of
proof in both senses of the word. Therefore the effect of ruling that
the presumption could not be mentioned to the jury had the incidental effect of making the presumption of no value whatever to the
party in whose favor it operated. But neither does Rule 14 give any
effect to the presumption in such a situation. The adoption of the rule
would therefore not change the Minnesota law in that situation.
In the case of a presumption based on facts which would justify
an inference, that inference might be suggested in instructions to
the jury even though Minnesota normally forbids comments on the
evidence by the judge.' 9 The presumption in the TePoel case probably would not support an inference notwithstanding the judge's
instruction that the jury could draw an inference. This would not,
of course, be error under Rule 14.
Another subsidiary point is that Rule 14 prescribes in clause (a)
that "the burden of establishing the non-existence of the presumed
fact is on the party against whom the presumption operates." It
does not specify what that burden is unless the word "establishing"
has the same meaning as the word "proof" in Rule 1(4). I should
think that the standard of proof specified by the latter rule would
control. At least one eminent writer believes that Rule 14 leaves the
matter unclear.2 0 Rule 1(4) on Burden of Proof will be discussed
below
Still another incidental point is that clause (a) of Rule 14
would require the judge to determine in the case of each presumption whether the facts from which the presumption is derived have
any probative value as evidence of the existence of the presumed
fact. That is a problem of relevance, and according to Rule 1(2),
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact." I offer no comment on whether that
definition vould modify Minnesota law.
Rule 15. Inconsistent Presumptions. If two presumptions
arise which are conflicting vith each other the judge shall apply
18. For a similar view see companion article by DeParcq, p. 312.
19. McCormick 672.
20. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Presumptions,2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 13,
25 (1954) ; compare Comment to Rule 14, last paragraph.
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the presumption which is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. If there is no such preponderance both
presumptions shall be disregarded.
It is a corollary of the Thayer doctrine that conflicting presumptions are impossible. The theory is that the establishment of a presumption will discharge the burden created by a previous inconsistent presumption and will itself create no burden.2 1 Rule 15
reverses this corollary by providing that, if one of two conflicting
presumptions be stronger than the other, the judge shall apply
the stronger. But Minnesota, notwithstanding its recent rigorous
adherence to the Thayer doctrine, has not always followed and
perhaps never would follow this corollary of it. In Coffman v.
Christenson, the court said "The presumption of innocence and
good faith is one of the strongest, and always prevails over one
giving rise to an inference of guilt or bad faith. 2 2 The presumptions involved were a presumption of actual possession based upon
proof of ownership opposed by a presumption of innocence. The
court seemed to hold that there was no proof of ownership so that
its statement about conflicting presumptions may have been a
dictum. Nevertheless it seems to have been a carefully considered
dictum for which a number of cases are cited. In a later case "3 the
court seemed to recognize that the problem of conflicting
presumptions was before the court in the earlier case. The court
said, "The fact that the demurrer in effect admits plaintiff's right
of possession relieves the case from conflicting presumptions, such
as were before the court in Coffman v Christenson.
" In Top/nka
v. Minn. Mitt. Life Ins. Co. 2 4 an action on a life policy in which
the defense was nonpayment of the first premium, the court held that
the burden of persuasion on the issue of payment was on the beneficiary, only the burden of going forward with the evidence was
shifted to the company by a presumption based on proof of possession of the policy judgment granting defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was affirmed. The opinion quoted
Coffman v. Christenson with apparent approval. Yet it seemed to
hold that one presumption would stand only until another arose and
that the case should be decided on the basis of what was considered
the more weighty inference. The difficulty with this analysis is that
conflicting inferences are for the jury and the court must have de21. See Model Code of Evidence, Rule 704, Comment 2(b) (1942).
22. 102 Minn. 460, 465, 113 N. W 1064, 1066 (1907).
23. Bena Townsite Co. v. Sauve, 104 Minn. 472, 474, 116 N. W 947,
948 (1908).
24. 189 Minn. 75, 248 N. W 660 (1933).
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cided the case on the basis of conflicting presumptions unless it
was finding that no jury could reasonably find payment under all
the circumstances of the case.25 In State v. Plymn0 Judge Mitchell
referred to conflicting presumptions but actually decided the case
on the ground that there was no presumption, but only an inference,
of continuance of life. On that basis there was a presumption of innocence operating in favor of the accused but since the prosecution
already had the burdens of producing evidence and of persuading
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, it could have little effect. Perhaps the thing to say about Rule 15"is that it would settle the law
of Minnesota.
Rule 16. Burden of Proof not Relaxed as to Some Presumnptions. A presumption, which by a rule of law may be overcome
only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing evidence, shall not be affected by Rules 14 or 15 and
the burden of proof to overcome it continues on the party against
whom the presumption operates.
This rule would not change the law, unless there is some measure
of persuasion in Minnesota other than the three contemplated by the
Uniform Rules. Rule 1(4) provides that
"'Burden of Proof' means the obligation of a party to meet
the requirements of a rule of law that the fact be proved either
by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case may be.
Burden of proof is synonymous with 'burden of persuasion.'"
The Minnesota cases cited by Wigmore2 7 show that the second
standard, by clear and convincing evidence, is recognized but with
various phrasings that obviously are not significant, such as "clear
and satisfactory," and "clear and positive." Are these standards
merely for the jury or are they also to be used for the guidance
of the judge or the appellate court in passing upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to send a case to the jury or to support a verdict or
finding? 28 This is a problem which the Uniform Rules have not
considered.
As to burden of proof and Rule 1: "It will be noted that the
'reasonable doubt' formula points to what we are really concerned
25. See Olson v. Duluth, M. & I. Ry., 213 Miinn. 106, 113, 5 N. NV. 2d
492, 496 (1942). "The defendant having proved only a violation of the statute
connected as cause with the injury, and no more, shifted to plaintiff the burden of the evidence, as distinguished from the burden of proof. The burden on
the plaintiff would then be to at least counterbalance the primna facie case
made by the showing of violation." The Topinka case %%,as cited as authority.

26. 43 Minn. 385, 45 N. W. 848 (1890).
27. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1954) (hereinafter
cited as Wigimore).
28. McCormick 681 nn. 19 & 20. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence
24 (1954).
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with, the state of the jury's mind, whereas the other two divert
attention to the evidence, which is a step removed, being the instrument by which the jury's mind is influenced.1 2 Minnesota appar-

ently has not decided whether the effect on the jury's mind should
be brought into the definition of burden of proof and into instructions to the jury except to say that evidence proponderates when
it is more convincing than the opposing evidence. Such a'definition
and instruction provides only a relative or comparative measure,
and may leave the jury in doubt although the evidence on the one
side is more convincing than on the other, as is the case when a
party's evidence may be held sufficient to go to the jury but not to
entitle him to a directed verdict. 80 To include the effect on the
jury's mind, however, presents the tricky problem of differentiating
three degrees of conviction. It has been said
"The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a
mode of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence
there can be yet no successful method of communicating intelligibly to a jury a sound method of self-analysis for one's belief."' '
It has nevertheless been suggested32 that "probably true," "highly
probably true," and "almost certainly true" will, with appropriate
instructions, do the trick. That seems a good suggestion, although
the author of it would submit the question in the form of whether the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence. The Model Code of Evidence uses that form. "Thus the preponderance of evidence bcomes the trier's belief in the preponderance of probability Some courts have boldly accepted this view "I"
But the jury might interpret it as still providing only a relative
standard and one wonders why the simple phrase, "probably true,"
(with explanations of the differences between that and "highly
probably true" and "almost certainly true") would not be adequate.
Unless Minnesota has gone into these rather subtle problems and
required that the preponderance of the evidence produce some
degree of belief by the jury, as some states have, Rule 1 (4), 14 and
16 would not change the law.
It seems certain that Minnesota would recognize the special
presumptions provided for in Rule 16 notwithstanding prior statements and intimations that there is but one rule for all prestump29. McCormick 676.
30. Ibid.
31. 9 Wigmore § 2497
32. McBame, Burden of Proof" Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242
(1944), McBame, Burden of Proof" Presumptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev.
13 (1954).
33. McCormick 677
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tions. We should recall the statement in the Ryan case that "We
are also within the restricted area of the presumption against
suicide," a clear warning that all presumptions will not be treated
alike.
II
Presumptions are slippery things.' Theyare slippery because
one may slip from presumption to inference and back again too
quickly for the eye, ear or mind to detect. Or one may slip from
sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a presumption to sufficiency of
the evidence to require a finding contrary to the presumed fact.
Then, too, after rebuttal of the presumption the inference remains
and may be treated as doing the same work as the presumption even
though the presumption is gone. Moreover, they elude us because
we have been accustomed to think as though there were but one
rule for all types of presumptions. Furthermore judge-jury problems
are involved and slight changes in the rule can be important, such
as the suggestion in the Ryan case that the evidence must be believed
by the jury. The possible variations, each more or less justifiable, 35
are innumerable. Finally, presumptions are slippery because of the
persistent ambiguity of the term "burden of proof" and because they
are in effect substantive as well as procedural so that legislatures
and courts are tempted to resort to them to accomplish substantive
policy and courts are tempted to resort to them to control juries.
If they can be made less slippery by statutory definition and prescription of their effects, such statutes should be enacted. That will
raise problems of the contents of the statutes and of how detailed
they should be. Since burden of persuasion is involved with the consequent necessity of giving instructions thereon, should standardized
instructions be included in the statutes? 8 If there is a danger that
the insertion of the word "fair" before the words "preponderance
of the evidence" will be held to constitute reversible error,3 T such
standardized instructions should be provided, it might be better
that appellate courts be less picayune.
But these are relatively unimportant details. The important
question is whether Minnesota should depart from its "one-nile"
34. See also companion article by DeParcq, p. 308.
35. "The judicial opinions exhibit some eight different views as to the
condition which must be fulfilled to prevent or modify or destroy the effect

which the establishment of the basic fact would have if it stood alone." These
eight views are then described. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 33
(1954).
36. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Presumnptions, 2 U. C. L. -. L. Rev.
13 (1954) so suggests with drafts of forms.
37. 12 Minn. L. Rev. 66 (1928).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEI

[Vol. 40:391

position, a rule that all presumptions merely shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence and do not effect the burden of
persuasion, except for special presumptions that require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence. Would
an attempt to do so merely unsettle the law in an area which has become fairly well settled and at a cost not adequately compensated by
the gain? It may be that the Uniform Rules are designed for states
in which the problems are still unsettled.
In the TePoel case the court said"
"The proper function and use of a presumption in the trial
of lawsuits continues to be the source of much confusion on the
part of bench and bar alike. It is a subject on which text writers,
teachers of law, and3 8 authors of legal articles have written much
and clarified little.3
Appellate courts have also written much. The Minnesota Court
has succeeded in making its position clear. But will it stand up? I
think not. It is almost certain to be departed from by the legislature
and by the court itself in one way or another, because presumptions
express policies of such varying importanace that they cannot be
held within one rule. At least they cannot be held within a rule that
gives them no more effect than merely to require the opponent of
the presumption to come forward with some testimony that the
jury may entirely discredit, nor within a rule that must be administered in such a way that it would be risky for a judge even to
mention the inference or the policy or policies-which may be additional to the inference--on which the presumption is based.
The views of the authors of periodical literature are well reported in McCormick3 and Morgan, 40 but Wigmore 4 does not
make conspicuous in his work the views of those who do not agree
with his theories. Also important are two recent articles dealing
42
with the Uniform Rules.
The literature on presumptions can be divided into three erasbefore Thayer,4 3 from Thayer to Bohlen," and subsequent to
Bohlen. I choose Bohlen's article as a dividing point because lie
penned "a devastating criticism" of the view derived from Thayer
38. 236 Minn. 482, 485, 53 N. W 2d 468, 470 (1952).
39. McCormick 635 n. 1.
40. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence (1954).
41. 9 Wigmore § 2490 n. 1.
42. Levin, Penwsylvania and the Uniform Rides of Evidence" Presumptions, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1954), McBame, Burden of Proof" Presninptions, 2 U. L. C. A. L. Rev. 13 (1954).
43. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law
(1898).
44. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presnuptions of Law Upon the

Burden of Proof, 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 307 (1920).
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and suggested a "rational treatment."' 5 Prior to Thayer the writers
had not generalized profitably. Thayer attempted to simplify and
there was derived from him, justly or unjustly and chiefly by Wigmore whose writings had great influence, the idea of one simple
rule for all presumptions-a rule that would limit their effect to a
shifting of the burden of going forward with the production of
evidence. Bohlen pointed 9 ut that this would not work justly. Subsequently McCormick dealt with the effect of departures from the
Thayer view upon the form of instructions to the jury. But Morgan
carefully pointed out that to have many rules, with instructions for
each, would not be administratively feasible, and concluded that
there should be one rule for most presumptions and that it should
shift the burden of persuation. As previously mentioned, Morgan
later changed to the two rules contained in Rule 14.40
One first must realize that there are choices to be made and,
since we are considering legislation, that these choices must be
made. Since the legislation is to concern "presumptions," a defini-tion of that term will be desired. It has been used with a variety
of meanings. A choice will have to be made between them. Likewise as to the effect of presumptions, they can provide a variety
of eight or ten results. Unless we are to have eight or ten classes
of presumptions, each with a separate effect, we shall have to decide
how many rules to have and the effect of each and choose which of
the possible effects we are to discard. If we discard a rule which has
merit, and include it under some broader rule which comprehends it,
we shall be providing formal or procedural' or general justice, but
not material or substantial or individual justice. For example, suppose there is a strict rule that non-suicide must be assumed to be the
fact unless there be testimony of suicide ¢which the trierof fact does
not entirely discredit; also suppose there is a general rule that nonsuicide must be assumed only until there be testimony of suicide
that would jiustify the trier in finding suicide, whether or not that
testimony be credited. Then the latter and broader rule comprehends
the former but eliminates the italicized words. By eliminating the
qualification of the italicized words we have eliminated whatever
merit there was in the qualification they express and that merit may
have been very substantial. "In justice the general rule is substituted
for the strictly individualized precepts of the moral ideal; common
types are substituted for subjects not strictly comparable with each
45. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Preumptiony, 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 906, 924 (1931).

46. See note 44 mtpra.
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",47 But a choice must be made as to how far to carry such a
other.
process. Shall we reduce all possible rules to one just to make the
law simple to administer ?48 The Uniform Rules make these choices.
So has the Minnesota court. The two differ as to the most important effect of a presumption. The Minnesota view has the support of the United States Supreme Court and, as stated in the
Comment to Rule 14, "a substantial number, perhaps a majority, of
recent decisions which have considered the question." But, as also
stated in that Comment"On the other hand, there is a strong argument for the view
that the jury needs guidance in this situation if they are to give
due effect to the probabilities and frequently the substantive
policy on which the presumption is based. Before the Thayer
discovery came into vogue, the practice of instructing on the
effect of presumptions was the established tradition. Wigmore,
who accepted and popularized the Thayer view, nevertheless
acknowledged in the last edition of his treatise, the need for
advising the jury that they could give special weiqht to the
course of experience as embodied in the presumption.'
That is to say, one rule-a rule that merely shifts the burden of
going forward with the evidence-does not have sufficient vigor to
do its job of implementing the important reasons of probability and
substantive policy that led to the creation of the presumption. Courts
will persist in doing what comes naturally, just as the Minnesota
courts have, with the consequent necessity of appeals and reversals.
One rule for a class of presumptions must have sufficient vigor to
serve the strongest of the class, not merely barely enough to serve
the weakest of them. As to the form of the instruction, the Comment
has this to say
"If the jury are to be advised, by what kind of instruction?
In some states it has been customary to tell them that the presumption is 'evidence.' It has sometimes been suggested that
they are to be told that it shall stand until met by evidence 'of
equal weight.' The most natural and helpful thing to tell them is
that they may find in accordance with the presumptions unless
they believe the evidence to the contrary This was the traditional type of instruction until Thayer pointed out the two
meanings of the 'burden of proof' and convinced the schools and
then the courts that a presumption shifted only one of the burdens, that is, the duty of producing evidence. But there is no
reason in the nature of things why it should not shift both the
burden of evidence and the burden of persuasion. Accordingly
we find the courts reverting from time to time to the ancient,
common-sense practice of charging the jury as to certain pre47 8 Encyc. of the Social Sciences 514 (1932).

48.

For another view see companion article by Geer, p. 349.
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sumptions having a substantial baciong ot probability, that the
presumption stands until overcome in the jury's mind by a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. In other words, the
presumption is a 'working' hypothesis which works by shifting the burden to the party against whom it operates of satisfymg the jury that the presumed inference is untrue. This often
gives a more satisfactory apportionment of the burden of persuasion on a particular issue than can be given by the general rule
that the pleader has the burden. One looks rather to the ultimate
goal, the case or defense as a whole, the other to a particular
fact-problem within the case. Moreover, an instruction that
the presumption stands until the jury are persuaded to the
contrary, has the advantage that it seems to make sense and
will be more readily understood by the jury than the other
types of instructions on presumptions."
A great deal has been said about the slipperiness of presumptions. I cannot say how much of their unmanageability and practical importance has been due to the attempt to strictly maintain the
Thayer view. Perhaps courts can be equally strict and technical in
dealing with a rule that shifts the burden of persuasion. The Comment which I have quoted implies that the presumption would be
mentioned to the jury. Morgan has suggested that the instruction
could merely describe the burden of proof without use of the word
"presumption" and that this should be done because that word
carries unpredictable connotations to the juror's mind. If that view
be adopted and strictly enforced, I was wrong in saying that the instruction given in the TePbel case would not be error if clause (a)
of Rule 14 were adopted. If appellate courts are determined to
control findings, they will find ways to do it. One way will be to
adopt the position, previously mentioned, that the court has not done
its full duty when it has described and stated the applicable burden
of proof to the jury -but may, in passing on the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal or in the trial court, reverse not because the
evidence was not sufficient to convince rational minds, but because
it did not preponderate, or was not clear and convincing, or could
not convince beyond a reasonable doubt. This, however, is likely to
lead to the citation of precedents and the consequent transformation
of questions of fact into questions of law, or the treatment of them as
such. But I should think that there would be fewer errors and
appeals and less confusion in the presumption problem if the courts
were permitted to give presumptions the natural, common sense
treatment, and if the bar had the better understanding of them that
should come from uniformity among the jurisdictions. This should
also lead to greater uniformity within a jurisdiction.
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Thayer has been charged or credited with the doctrine that goes
under his name. I should like to let him say a few words for himself on that.49
"If, now, it be asked, 'What particular effect have rules of
presumption in applying the law of evidence?' The answer seems
to be that they have the same effect (and no other), which they
have in all the other regions of legal reasoning. Their effect
results necessarily from their characteristic quality-the quality,
namely, which imputes to certain facts or groups of fact a prona
facie significance or operation. In the conduct, then, of an argument, or of evidence, they throw upon him against whom they
operate the duty of meeting this imputation. Should nothing
further be adduced, they may settle the question in a certain
way, and so he who would not have it settled thus, must show
cause. This appears to be the whole effect of a presumption, and
so of a rule of presumption. There are, indeed, various rules
of presumption which appear to do more than this-to fix the
amount of proof to be adduced, as well as the duty of adducing
it. But in these cases also, the presumption, merely as such, goes
no further than to call for proof of that which it negatives, i.e.,
for something which renders it probable. It does not specify how
much, whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of all the evidence, or by any other measure of proof.
From the nature of the case, in negativing a given supposition
and calling for argument or evidence in support of it, there is
meant such an amount of evidence or reason as may render the
view contended for rationally probable. But beyond that, a presumption seems to say nothing. When, therefore, we read that
the contrary of any particular presumption must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as is sometimes said, e.g., of the 'presumption of innocence' and the presumption of legitimacy, it is to
be recogmzed that we have something superadded to the rule
of presumption, namely, another rule as to the amount of evidence which is needed to overcome the presumption, or, in other
words, to start the case of the party who is silenced by it. And
so, wherever any specific result is attributed to a presumption
other than that of fixing the duty of going forward with proof.
This last, and this alone, appears to be characteristic and essential work of the presumption. It is the substantive criminal law
and the substantive law as to persons respectively that fix the
rule about the strength of conviction that must be produced in
the mind of the tribunal in order to hold one guilty of crime,
or to find a child born in wedlock to be illegitimate."
To me, Thayer did not mean, or even say that there was but one
rule for all presumptions and that it merely shifted the burden of
producing evidence. He said, "There are, indeed, various rules
of presumption which appear to do more than this-to fix the
49. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law,
336 (1898).
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amount of proof to be adduced, as well as the duty of adducing it.
But in these cases also, the presumption, merely as suck goes no
further than to call for proof.. . It does not specify how much....
This ... alone, appears to be the characteristicand essential work
of -the presumption." [Italics added.] In short, a presumption may
shift the burden of persuasion and add to the burden, but it does
-not do this "as such"; these factors are not the "characteristic and
essential" work of the presumption. Now, obviously, it makes no
difference whether a thing accomplishes a result "as such" and as
its "characteristic and essential work" or does it merely incidentally.
I suspect that Thayer's notion would never have been carried to
that point; nor to believing'that all presumptions have the same
effect were it not for our innate yearning for generalization and
simplicity, aided perhaps by the unconscious thought of one wordpresumption-therefore one rule. Professor Thayer had been arguing that presumptions are not evidence or even a part of the law of
evidence, but substantivein their nature.
"The rule fixes the legal effect of fact, its legal equivalence
vith another. And it makes no difference in the essential nature
of the rule whether this effect is fixed absolutely or prima facie:
it gives a legal definition. Such is the nature of all rules to
determine the legal effect of facts as contrasted with their logical
effect." 50
Professor Thayer was also arguing that presumptions are not inferences, though they miay be based, wholly or in part, on an inference.
"Presumptions are aids to reasoning and argumentation,

which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of
some given inquiry. They may be grounded on general e-xperi-

ence, or probability, of any kind; or merely on policy and convemence.... Presumptions are not m themselves either argument or evidence, although for the time being they accomplish
the result of both. . . . Presumption, assumption, taking for
granted, are simply so many names for an act or process which
aids and shortens inquiry and argument."'
"Relating, as these declarations do, to specified facts and
groups of facts, and certain aspects and consequences of them,
they belong to that part of the substantive law which deals with
these particular things; and as has been truly remarked, they
can be understood only in connection with these branches of
the-law. They do not belong to the law of evidence."52
From these excerpts, one can understand the apparent assertion
that there is but one rule for all presumptions and at the same time
different rules for different presumptions. I do not believe that the
50. Id. at 317. 51. Id. at 314-315.
52. Id. at 326-327.
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weight of Thayer's scholarship can justly be put behind the doctrine
that goes under his name. ie recognized that there may be different
rules for different presumptions, and that many of the rules may
shift or add to the burden of persuasion. That is the main point, and
it is unimportant whether this is done by a rule of law accompanying
the presumption rather than the presumption itself. He said in effect
that a presumption at least shifts the burden of producing evidence,
but he did not say that a presumption should have no greater effect.
Had he been faced with deciding whether a one-rule-for-most
presumptions should shift the burden of producing evidence or
should also shift the burden of persuasion, one cannot say from his
writings that he would not have chosen the latter. No one has ever
pointed out more clearly than Thayer did with specific examples
how both courts and legislatures have utilized the presumption device to effect substantive policy as well as to have judicial determinations accord with what is probably true. The important thing for us
is that a rule of presumption is almost as important as a rule of
substantive law in that it gives a litigant two objectives instead of
only one at which to aim his evidence-it is, as Thayer pointed out,
a rule of equivalence or of temporary equivalence. A litigant may
not have evidence to prove that the addressee of a letter received it,
yet be able to prove that it was properly addressed, stamped, and
mailed. Presumptions are based upon more or less strong probabilities, or upon more or less strong substantive policy considerations,
or upon both, therefore the weight of evidence required to rebut a
presumption should also vary with the reason for it and the substantive policy upon which it is based.
If the seven or more possible rules which deal with the termination of the necessity for assuming the presumed fact are to be compressed into one, it should have sufficient vigor to serve the more
important policies and stronger probabilities upon which the rules
are based, even though it may overserve some of them. This is not
self-evident. A thing should not be too much overdone any more
than too much underdone. Granting that overdoing would be the
better if a choice were forced, a choice is not forced; two or more
rules can be provided, as is done by the Uniform Rules. Is the Minnesota rule too weak for some presumptions ? Is the rule that shifts
the burden of persuasion too strong for some presumptions? If the
answer to either question is "yes," then two rules are required.
Questions of constitutionality aside, a rule shifting the burden
of persuasion is not too strong for any presumption. 8 If it is, the
53. Cf. McBaine, Burden of Proof" Presumptions,2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev.
13 (1954).
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line should not be drawn solely on the ground that a presumption is
based upon probability-that is whether the basic facts of the
presumption would support an inference. Substantive policies play
too great a part to be ignored. One would be hard put to find any
other basis for drawing a line short of having the legislature classify
each presumption--"a monstrous task'--or leaving it for the trial
judge to decide in each case. The latter solution was rejected by the
American Law Institute, by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and by writers, as granting too much discretion and placing
too great a burden on the judges.
The American Law Institute, by a vote of 59 to 42, decided
upon one rule for all presumptions except the presumption of
legitimacy and selected the rule that a presumption merely shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence. But this was done in
part because of some doubt of the constitutionality of a rule that
would shift the burden of persuasion and because so many courts
had, as Minnesota has, adopted the Thayer view. It was done
against the judgment of the draftsmen, who would have had all
presumptions, including the special presumptions that require "clear
and convincing" evidence but excluding the presumption of legitimacy, shift the burden of persuasion but not add to the burden.
It would seem, then, that the solutions of the Uniform Rules are
sound except possibly for presumptions based solely upon social
policy and not upon an inference. Except for those and the undesirability of having two rules where one would serve, the two-rulefor-most-presumptions solution of the Uniform Rules is feasible
and desirable. There are presumptions based on substantive policy
aloneOBut one might ask whether it would unsettle the law to
force a listing by the legislature of such presumptions or to force a
decision by the trial judge "in the heat and hurry of the trial" as to
whether a presumption is based upon an inference.
Inferences are vague and of indeterminate probative force. Rule
1(2) of the Uniform Rules provides that "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact." There is such tendency in reason if, "[T]he proposition
of fact is more probably or likely true as to this man [or event or
condition]- than an identical proposition as to a person [or event or
condition] of whom nothing is known."55 This would have to be
decided without regard to whatever else was known and without
54. Chafee, Progressof the Law, 1919-1921, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 312

(1922).

55. Morgan and Maguire, Cases and Materials on Evidence, 122 (1951).
See also, Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 160 (1954), and James,
Relevancy, Probability,and the Law, 29 Calif. I. Rev. 789 (1941).
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regard to the opposing evidence. If this be true, it should not be
difficult to decide whether a presumption is based on an inference"
or merely on policy However the inference in the particular case
may be so overwhelmed by opposing evidence that it can only
doubtfully be said to exist, yet be so far supported by other evidence
that the burden of persuasion would theoretically and perhaps practically decide the case.51 But what is the harm? Is there an inj ustice
in requiring the party asserting the initially improbable to carry
the burden of persuasion?
I would have but one rule for most presumptions-the rule that
shifts the burden of persuasion. I surmise that the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws would have done the same, were
it not for a fear that to do so, in cases where the basic facts would
not support an inference, would be unconstitutional. Under the
position of the United States Supreme Court a rule of presumption
that shifts the burden of persuasion necessarily makes the basic facts
of the presumption into evidence and this cannot be done unless
there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the
ultimate facts presumed. I have chosen to discuss the problems
largely without regard to the constitutional question because I
thought it more useful so to do. So long as the United States Supreme Court adheres to its view, however, there is no choice except
for Minnesota to follow its present decisions or adopt the two rules
of Rule 14 and thus reverse the TePoel case as to all presumptions
based on facts which will support an inference.
CONCLUSIONS

Prior to Thayer there was some confusion about presumptions
and the difference between a presumption and an inference with a
consequent confusion of terminology as evidenced by the "presumption of fact" and "presumption of law" concepts. Thayer provided
analyses of the judge-jury problems, of the ambiguous "burden of
proof" problem and of the nature of presumptions. Wigmore in his
16th edition of Greenleaf in 1899 derived from Thayer a one-rule
that presumptions merely shift the burden of producing evidence.
The courts began to more or less follow Wigmore. It was a beautifully simple and intellectually appealing solution. But at least as
early as 1920 writers began to perceive that such a rule would not
56. See 19 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1935) ; 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 521.

57

See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gainer, 303 U. S. 161 (1938), Wat-

kins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934), Tice v. Crowder,
119 Kan. 494 (1925), Annotations, 103 A. L. R. 105, 112 A. L. R. 337, 121
A.L.R. 1078, Hartman, The Presumption against Suicide as Applied tn the
Trial of Insurance Cases, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 20 (1954).
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adequately serve the, reason for the creation of presumptions. At
least one court attempted to classify presumptions according to the
reasons for creating them with a separate rule for each class." But
both courts and writers could see that it would not be administratively feasible to have many rules with an instruction appropriate
for each rule. All came to the conclusion that there should be one
rule for all except certain special presumptions. The question wvas,
which rule-the rule that me ely shifted the burden of producing
evidence or the rule that shifted the burden of persuasion also? The
courts under the influence of Wigmore and the American Law
Institute under the influence of the courts and a fear of a constitutionality question, chose the former rule. That rule was not strong
enough for some presumptions so that there were sporadic but
persistent departures from or violations of the rule by both trial
and appellate courts. The law was not uniform among the jurisdictions or even within many single jurisdictions. The Uniform Rules
were therefore promulgated. They were based upon the Model Code
and drafted with the assistance of Mr. Morgan, the Reporter, and
Mr. Maguire, the draftsman of the Model Code. They provide a
compromise by adopting both rules, but, as I suppose, did not
adopt the stronger rule for all presumptions because of a constitutionality reason. For most presumptions it will permit the courts
to do what seems to come naturally for them, i.e., to give the jury
an instruction on presumptions. Notwithstanding that Minnesota
has come to its present rule after considerable effort and cost, it
should consider seriously the adoption of the Uniform Rules as an
opportunity to contribute to uniformity and a diminution of the
confusion of the presumption problem.
Adoption of the Rules in modified form may be considered.
Perhaps the Model Code of the American Law Institute will be the
source of some additions and McBaine's articles should be studied
for a possible addition of forms for instructions to the jury. In considering all questions, the desirability of uniformity and-the dangers
of destroying it should be kept in mind. The Uniform Rules state
the rules with remarkable simplicity. They should not be unnecessarily complicated.
58. See McCormick 641.

